European Union Banking Sector Statistics (2012)

Collection: EUBSS : European Union Banking Sector Statistics 


European Union Banking Sector Statistics (2012)


andrea.pagano (at)


How to cite

Pagano, Andrea; Di Girolamo, Francesca (2017): European Union Banking Sector Statistics (2012). European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) [Dataset] PID:


banking economy

Data access

Sample statistics (2012)
  • European Union Banking Sector Statistics (2012) - Excel format: EU 28 banking sector sample aggregate by countries. Sample Statistics. JRC elaboration on Bankscope data.

Population Statistics (2012)
  • European Union Banking Sector Statistics (2012) - Excel format: EU 28 banking sector population

    aggregate by countries. Population statistics. Main data

    sources are Eurosta for GDP; BIS for banks' exposusres; ECB for Total Assets.

    JRC survey for covered and eligible deposits.

Sample DB source
  • Information about main source for EU 28 banking sector sample.

Financial risk key "drivers"
  • Graph showing three key drivers associated to banks' default probability. Sample aggregates by countries.


Debt Bias in Corporate Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises in the EU
Langedijk S, Nicodeme G, Pagano A, Rossi A. Debt Bias in Corporate Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises in the EU. Taxation Papers (50); 2014. p. 1-37. JRC94081
  • European Commission, Luxemburg, Luxemburg
Publication page 
  • Abstract

    During the period 2008-2012, EU governments incurred substantial costs bailing out banks. As corporate income taxation (CIT) in most countries still favors debt- over equity financing, reducing or eliminating this debt bias would complement regulatory reforms reducing costs of financial crises. To estimate this effect, we use a two-step approach. First, using panel regressions on a dataset of 32,833 bank-year observations we find sizable long-run effects of CIT on leverage in the EU. Second, we simulate the effect of tax reforms on bank losses using a Vasicek-based model with actual banks’ balance sheets to estimate costs of systemic crises for six large EU member states. Even if the tax elasticity of bank leverage is taken at the lower end of the ranges found in recent literature, eliminating the debt bias could lead to reductions of public finance losses in the range of 60 to 90%. The results hold even when considering much smaller effects for banks that are close to the regulatory minimum capital requirement of the Basel III framework. Even when asset portfolio risk is allowed to increase endogenously and considering conservative ranges of the parameter space, we conclude that tax reforms to remove the debt bias can result in very sizable reductions in risks and costs of financial crises.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: a farewell to bail-out?
Benczur, P., Cannas, G., Cariboni, J., Di Girolamo, F., Maccaferri, S. and Petracco Giudici, M., Evaluating the effectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: a farewell to bail-out, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, ISSN 1572-3089, 33, 2017, p. 207-223, JRC99395.
Publication page 
  • Abstract

    In response to the economic and financial crisis, the EU has adopted a new regulatory framework of the banking sector. Its central elements consist of new capital requirements, the single rulebook, and rules for bank recovery and resolution. These legislations have been adopted to reduce the call for government bail-out of distressed banks in future crises. The present study performs a detailed quantitative assessment of the reduction in public finance costs brought about by the introduction of these rules. We use a microsimulation portfolio model, which implements the Basel risk assessment framework, to estimate the joint distribution of bank losses at EU level. The approach incorporates the complete safety-net set up in EU legislation to absorb these losses, explicitly modelling enhanced Basel III capital rules, the bail-in tool and the resolution funds. Using a near-full sample of commercial, cooperative and savings banks in the EU, we quantify the cumulative effects of this safety-net and the contribution of each individual tool to the total effect. Considering a crisis of a similar magnitude as the recent one, our results show that potential costs for public finances decrease from roughly 3.7% of EU GDP (before the introduction of any new tool) to 1.4% with bail-in, and finally to 0.5% when all the elements we model are in place. This latter amount is very close to our estimate of leftover resolution funds and the size of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme. This exercise extends the quantitative analyses performed by the European Commission in its Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda by developing additional scenarios, crucial robustness checks, simulations for different annual data vintages, and by implementing some methodological improvements.

Geographic areas

European Union

Temporal coverage

From date To date
2012-01-01 2012-12-31

Additional information

Published by
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
Created date
Modified date
Issued date
Landing page 
Data theme(s)
Economy and finance
Update frequency